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ILLINOIS COURTS AND FOREIGN CORPORATIONS:
JURISDICTION GONE AWRY-
BRABAND V. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP.
Since Pennoyer v. Neff, ' the United States Supreme Court consistently
has held that a state's power to enter in personam 2 judgments bind-
ing upon non-resident defendants is limited by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 3 Over the years, various concepts, such as
"consent" and "presence," were used by the courts to determine the line of
limitation. 4 The landmark cases of International Shoe Co. v. Washington 5
and Shaffer v. Heitner 6 purported to eliminate these differing rationales for
determining the extent of state court jurisdiction. 7 Under International
Shoe, jurisdiction was to be premised upon whether a defendant had
"minimum contacts" with the forum state sufficient to comport with "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' These somewhat "elastic
1. 95 U.S. 714 (1878). Pennoyer focused on the territorial limits of a state's judicial powers.
By concluding that the authority of every tribunal was restricted by the territorial limits of the
state in which it was established, Pennoyer sharply limited the availability of in personam juris-
diction over non-resident defendants. Id. at 720. Under Pennoyer, the state could render judg-
ment binding a defendant personally only if he or she was physically present and served with
process within the forum state. But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-200 (1977);
Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963
U. ILL. L.F. 533 [hereinafter cited as Currie]. Pennoyer was expressly overruled by the Su-
preme Court in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 206.
2. Jurisdiction is the power or authority of a court to decide a case or controversy. To
render a valid judgment, a court must have not only jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
litigation, but also jurisdiction over parties to the dispute (in personam jurisdiction) or property
in dispute (in rem jurisdiction). M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 3-4 (1972).
3. See Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978); Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S.
341, 345 (1972); D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 184 (1972); Zenith Corp. v.
Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969); Western Union Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 74
(1961); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957).
4. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The evolutionary process
surrounding jurisdictional questions in connection with foreign defendants has involved an ac-
ceptance and later a rejection of such concepts as "consent," "doing business," and "presence."
Id. at 222. In particular, the courts found that foreign corporations either had "impliedly con-
sented" to jurisdiction in the forum, had been "constructively present" in the state, or had an
agent "doing business" when served with process. Currie, supra note 1, at 535. See, e.g., Hess
v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) ("consent"); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100 (1898)
("presence" and "doing business"); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 598 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856)
("consent" and "presence").
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. For a general discussion of the various conceptual stages of state court jurisdiction over
non-resident defendants see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196-206 (1977); Hazard, A Gen-
eral Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 241.
8. The Court said:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
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standards" 9 were further interpreted by Shaffer to require, at a minimum,
some relationship between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum. 10
In Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 11 the Illinois Supreme Court con-
strued these standards to allow a cause of action that arose in Canada 12 to
be maintained in Illinois against a foreign corporation 13 doing only min-
imal business in the state. 14 The circuit court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to quash service of process and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 15 This
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted).
9. Justice Black, commenting on the majority's opinion in International Shoe and the stan-
dards it enunciated, said: "No one, not even those who most feared a democratic government,
ever formally proposed that courts should be given power . . . under any such elastic stan-
dards." Id. at 325. At least one commentator has suggested that the International Shoe stan-
dards are flexible to the point of varying with the economic and moral values at issue in a
particular suit. See Carrington & Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State
Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 227, 231-33 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Carrington & Martin].
10. The Shaffer Court interpreted International Shoe as follows:
[In International Shoe] the inquiry into the State's jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration appropriately focused not on whether the corporation was "present" but on
whether there have been "such contacts of the corporation with the state of the
forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there." [326
U.S.] at 317. . . . [T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the liti-
gation . . . became the central concern of the inquiry into personal jurisdiction.
Shaffer v: Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 203-04 (1977).
11. 72 I11. 2d 548, 382 N.E.2d 252 (1978).
12. Braband involved a strict liability cause of action brought under the Illinois Wrongful
Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ 1, 2. The pilots of an allegedly defective aircraft were
killed when the plane in which they were traveling crashed as it approached the airport in
Frobisher Bay, Northwest Territories, Canada. 72 I11. 2d at 550, 382 N.E.2d at 253.
13. The defendant, Beech Aircraft Corporation, is not incorporated in Illinois, nor is it qual-
ified, authorized, or otherwise chartered or licensed to do business in Illinois. Excerpts From
Record at 65, Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 Ill. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1st Dist.
1977) [hereinafter cited as Record].
14. See notes 53-56, 125-28, and accompanying text infra.
15. The circuit court found that it did not offend due process to require a foreign corpora-
tion to defend a cause of action in Illinois for the death of Illinois residents, even though the
cause of action did not occur in Illinois. This decision was based strictly on a "foreseeability"
test for jurisdiction. The circuit court's order was as follows:
1. Beech can foresee and knows that aircraft which they manufacture will be flown
by Illinois residents;
2. The crash of the Beech Queen Air aircraft near Frobisher Bay, Northwest Ter-
ritories, Canada, resulted in the death of plaintiffs' decedents who were residents of
the State of Illinois;
3. It does not offend traditional notions of fair play and effective justice to require
Beech to defend this action in the courts of Illinois, when the action involved
deaths of Illinois residents because of an alleged defect in the aircraft and; [sic]
4. That, based upon the above findings, defendant Beech is amenable to process
issued by a court of the State of Illinois with respect to this action.
Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., No. 72 L 16617 (Cir. Ct. I11. July 29, 1975) (order denying
motion to dismiss).
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was affirmed by the appellate court in a divided opinion. 16 In upholding
the appellate court, however, the Illinois Supreme Court substantially
broadened the ability of Illinois courts to assert jurisdiction over foreign cor-
porations.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze and critique the rationale of
Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. It will demonstrate that the Braband opin-
ion does not comport with the standards set forth by the United States Su-
preme Court in International Shoe and Shaffer. The Note will also show that
even if Braband was decided correctly, its confused and inarticulate
rationale, unless corrected, will have a detrimental impact on subsequent
cases.
THE COURT'S DECISION
Knowledge of the pertinent facts in Braband is critical to an analysis of
the court's decision. The allegedly defective airplane in which plaintiffs' de-
cedents were travelling at the time of their death was manufactured by the
defendant, Beech Aircraft Corp., a Delaware company with its principal
place of business in Kansas. 17 In 1966, the aircraft originally was manufac-
tured and sold in Kansas to a Texas firm. Two years later the Texas firm sold
it to a company in Nevada. Three years after that it was sold to an Illinois
firm who later sold it to a British company. 18 While the plane was being
ferried to the British company, it crashed in Frobisher Bay, Northwest Ter-
ritories, Canada. 19
The Illinois Supreme Court first determined that the cause of action did
not arise out of any business the defendant may have transacted in Il-
linois. 20 The court also found that the action did not arise from any act of
16. 51 I11. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (lst Dist. 1977). Justice Jiganti, author of the
majority opinion, found jurisdiction in Illinois pursuant to § 17 of the Civil Practice Act, ILL
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17, because Beech allegedly had committed a "tortious act" in Illinois
(i.e., by the alleged delivery in Illinois of a defective plane which subsequently crashed in
Canada, causing economic harm to the plaintiffs who were Illinois residents). 51 I11. App. 3d at
300-01, 367 N.E.2d at 122. Justices Stamos and Downing disagreed. Justice Stamos, in a special
concurring opinion, stated that the defendant was amenable to service of process under §§ 13.3
and 16 of the Civil Practice Act by virtue of its contractual relationship with Hartzog Aviation,
an independently-owned Illinois corporation who sells Beech aircraft but who did not sell the
aircraft in question. 51 111. App. 3d at 304-06, 367 N.E.2d at 124-26 (Stamos, J., concurring).
Justice Downing did not accept either theory. He concluded that the cause of action did not
arise from the commission of a tortious act in Illinois, and that Beech was not "present" in
Illinois so as to justify suit against the defendant in Illinois. Thus, service on Beech should be
quashed. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 308-13, 367 N.E.2d at 127-31 (Downing, J., dissenting). Because of
these disparate views, the appellate court granted a certificate of importance to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 316.
17. 51 111. App. 3d at 307, 367 N.E.2d at 127.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 297, 367 N.E.2d at 120.
20. 72 111. 2d at 557, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
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the defendant's alleged Illinois "distributor" 2 1 nor from any relationship be-
tween the defendant and the "distributor." 22  Despite this, the defendant
was found to be amenable to service of process under sections 13.3 and 16 of
the Civil Practice Act. 23 The court reasoned that due to the defendant's
relationship with an independently-owned Illinois corporation 24 who had
nothing to do with the aircraft in question and because of other alleged con-
tacts in Illinois, 25 the defendant had engaged in activities sufficient to ren-
der it amenable to service. 26  Thus, by finding jurisdiction under sections
13.3 and 16, the court determined that Beech was a de facto resident of the
state, even though it was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal
place of business in Kansas. 27
The court reasoned that due to the inherent mobility of its products,
Beech could assume that its aircraft would be owned or flown by Illinois
21. Hartzog Aviation is the independently-owned Illinois company with whom Beech had a
nonexclusive, mutually cancellable contract whereby Hartzog was permitted to sell and service
Beech airplanes in certain counties of midwestern states, including Illinois. The agreement,
which was for one year with a thirty-day termination clause, permitted Hartzog to purchase, in
Kansas, specified models of new Beech aircraft for resale to the public. The agreement by its
terms had as its stated objective the sale of seven airplanes. Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
51 111. App. 3d 296, 311-12, 367 N.E.2d 118, 130 (1st Dist. 1977). It is interesting to note that
the court referred to Hartzog as "defendant's distributor," although a reading of the Record
reveals that at no time was Hartzog found to be legally a franchisee or distributor of Beech. 72
Ill. 2d at 557, 382 N.E.2d at 256.
22. 72 I11. 2d at 557, 382 N.E.2d at 256. These findings of fact were stipulated to by the
parties to the suit. Record, supra note 13, at 63-68. For a more extensive discussion of the
facts, see 51 Ill. App. 3d at 297-98, 311-12, 367 N.E.2d at 120, 125-27, 130 (1st Dist. 1977).
23. 72 I11. 2d at 560, 382 N.E.2d at 257. Sections 13.3 and 16 of the Civil Practice Act
provide in pertinent part:
§ 13.3. Service on private corporations. A private corporation may be served
(1) by leaving a copy of the process with its registered agent or any officer or agent
of said corporation found anywhere in the State; or (2) in any other manner now or
hereafter permitted by law. A private corporation may also be notified by publica-
tion and mail in like manner and with like effect as individuals.
§ 16. Personal service outside State. (1) Personal service of summons may be
made upon any party outside the State. If upon a citizen or resident of this State or
upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State, it
shall have the force and effect of personal service of summons within this State;
otherwise it shall have the force and effect offservice by publication.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 13.3, 16 (emphasis added).
24. See note 21 supra.
25. Other alleged activities of Beech included advertisements in Chicago area telephone
books and attendance at one sales promotion dinner with Hartzog. For a more thorough de-
scription of Beech's contacts with Illinois see notes 53-56, 125-28, and accompanying text infra.
26. The court did not comment on whether the activities of Hartzog Aviation alone would
serve as a sufficient basis for asserting jurisdiction. 72 I11. 2d at 558, 382 N.E.2d at 257. This
would have required a discussion of whether or not a principal-agent relationship existed be-
tween Beech and Hartzog. Such a discussion would have lent more credibility to the court's
finding that Beech was "present and doing business" in Illinois.
27. 51 111. App. at 307, 367 N.E.2d at 130.
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residents both within and outside of Illinois. 28 This mobility of airplanes
and airplane parts thus became a significant factor in the court's decision that
notions of fair play and substantial justice were not offended. 29 In essence,
Beech had assumed the risk of such a suit. Finally, because the Illinois Su-
preme Court found that jurisdiction existed under sections 13.3 and 16, it
declined to consider whether a "tortious act" had been committed within the
meaning of the section 17 "long-arm" statute. 30
The court's opinion is noteworthy in the first instance for not considering
use of this "long-arm" statute. Generally, in cases where the defendant is a
foreign corporation 31 and the plaintiffs allege injury in Illinois, the section
17 "long-arm" statute is used to obtain jurisdiction. 32 Although section 17
was both one of the plaintiffs' major contentions throughout the litigation 33
and the basis of the appellate court's majority opinion,-' the Illinois Su-
preme Court w> s strangely silent on its applicability in the instant case. 3 5
The court's reluctance to assert section 17 jurisdiction apparently stemmed
28. 72 Ill. 2d at 559, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
29. Id.
30. 72 11. 2d at 560, 382 N.E.2d at 257. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17, provides in perti-
nent part:
§ 17. Act submitting to jurisdiction-Process. (1) Any person, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the
acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and, if an individual, his
personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause
of action arising from the doing of any such acts:
(b) the commission of a tortious act within this State;
(2) Service of process upon any person who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of this State, as provided in this Section, may be made by personally serving
the summons upon the defendant outside this State, as provided in this Act, with
the same force and effect as though summons had been personally served within
this State. (3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be
asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based
upon this Section.
31. In the instant case, the defendant, Beech Aircraft Corp., is incorporated in Delaware,
has its principal place of business in Wichita, Kansas, and is neither licensed to do business in
Illinois nor owns or rents any property in Illinois. No employees or directors of Beech reside in
or are stationed in Illinois and Beech pays no Illinois taxes. Record, supra note 13, at 65.
32. In cases involving non-resident defendants like Beech, jurisdiction is usually asserted
under section 17. See, e.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d
432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Nelson v. Miller, 11 11. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Stansell v.
Int'l Fellowship, Inc., 22 Ill. App. 3d 959, 318 N.E.2d 149 (1st Dist. 1974).
33. See Brief for Appellee at 14, Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 72 IIl. 2d 548, 382 N.E.2d
252 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Appellee's Supreme Court Brief]; Brief for Appellee at 35,
Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 I11. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1st Dist. 1977) [here-
inafter cited as Appellee's Appellate Brief); Record, supra note 13, at 13.
34. See Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 Il. App. 3d 296, 367 N.E.2d 118 (1st Dist.
1977) (Jiganti, J., majority opinion).
35. 72 Ill. 2d at 560, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
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from its inability to find case law to support the proposition that the cause of
action arose in Illinois, an absolute requirement for section 17 jurisdiction. 36
In Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 37 the lead-
ing case on the concept of "tortious act" within the meaning of section 17,
the Illinois Supreme Court previously stated that "the place of a wrong is
where the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor li-
able."-38  The plaintiffs in Braband argued that the event giving rise to the
cause of action was the "economic effect" caused by the wrongful deaths of
their husbands. The plaintiffs reasoned that these detrimental "economic ef-
fects" in and of themselves constituted "the commission of a tortious act" in
Illinois; therefore, the cause of action arose in Illinois. 39
The Braband court was apparently aware, however, that there are no
cases holding that the "economic effects" 4 0 from a tortious injury consti-
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(3), supra note 30. The purpose of § 17(3) is "to insure
that there is a close relationship between a non-resident defendant's jurisdictional activities and
the cause of action against which he must defend." Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 II1.
App. 2d 242, 252-53, 219 N.E.2d 646, 651 (1st Dist. 1966) (citation omitted). See also ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 17 Historical and Practice Notes (Smith-Hurd).
37. 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
38. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63, citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 377. In Gray, the plaintiff was injured when a water heater, containing an allegedly defective
safety valve manufactured by defendant, exploded. The defendant foreign corporation argued
that it was not amenable to service of process because it had committed no tort in Illinois, did
no business in Illinois, and the allegedly defective product had been sold to another company
outside Illinois for use in the latter's products. Id. at 434, 176 N.E.2d at 762. Because the
actual injury had occurred in Illinois (a significant fact which distinguishes the case from
Braband), the defendant was deemed to have a substantial connection with the forum and,
therefore, it was not unjust to hold the defendant answerable for injuries caused by his prod-
ucts. Id. at 442, 176 N.E.2d at 766. Noting that "[u]nder such circumstances the courts of the
place of injury usually provide the most convenient forum for trial," the court denied the de-
fendant's motion to quash service of process. Id. at 443-44, 176 N.E.2d at 767.
39. The plaintiffs in Braband reasoned that Illinois juridiction existed because the defend-
ant inflicted injury on Illinois residents and incurred an obligation to the survivors of those
residents by the manufacture and sale of a defective aircraft. See Appellee's Supreme Court
Brief, supra note 33, at 15. At first reading, this argument appears to be supported by RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAVS § 37 (1971) which states:
A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes
effects in the state by an act done elsewhere with respect to any cause of action
arising from these effects unless the nature of the effects and of the individual's
relationship to the state make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable.
As the United States Supreme Court noted, however, in the recent case of Kulko v. Superior
Court of Cal., 436 U.S. 84, 96 (1978), § 37 was designed "to reach wrongful activity outside the
State causing injury within the state . I." d. The examples accompanying § 37 would not
support such an "effects" oriented test for the assertion of jurisdiction as that proposed by the
plaintiffs.
40. The Second Circuit addressed such an "effects" argument in American Eutectic Welding
Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971), quoting Black v. Oberle
Rentals, Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 398, 400, 285 N.Y.S.2d 226, 229 (1967), when it stated:
Certainly every person injured in an accident has resultant damage as well as the
personal injury. He may suffer lost earnings, diminution of earning capacity, long
[Vol. 28:11211126
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tute a separate tort. 41 A tort consists of a breach of duty to the injured
party, 42 and the situs of the alleged wrong is determined by the last event
caused by the asserted misconduct of the defendant. 43 In Braband, the last
event did not occur in Illinois. The alleged breach of duty was the defective
manufacture of an aircraft in Kansas and the alleged wrong occurred at the
situs of the crash in Canada. 44 As Justice Downing noted in his dissent to
the appellate opinion, "the thin thread of pecuniary loss to the plaintiffs in
periods of convalescence and all such attendant damages. Conceptually it is difficult
for this Court to hold that a personal or property injury in another State by virtue
of a tortious act committed in that State can be said to have suffered some injury
within the State of New York simply because he is domiciled here. . . . To hold
otherwise would open a veritable Pandora's Box of litigation subjecting every con-
ceivable prospective defendant involved in an accident with a New York domiciliary
to defend actions brought against them in the State of New York. This is hardly the
minimal contact with the State prerequisite to the exercise of its power over a
prospective defendant.
439 F.2d 428, 434 (2d Cir. 1971) (citation omitted).
41. In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), the United States Su-
preme Court discussed the "economic effects" in the forum resulting from the defendant's ac-
tivities there but found jurisdiction based on a number of factors-the most important of which
was the "substantial connection" which the subject matter of the litigation, an insurance con-
tract, had with the forum. Id. at 223. See notes 84-88 and accompanying text infra.
42. The concept of "tortious act" within the meaning of § 17 was discussed by the Fifth
District Circuit Court of Illinois in Poindexter v. Willis, 87 I11. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (5th
Dist. 1967). The court held that "the word 'tortious' as used in § 17(1)(b) of [the Civil Practice
Act] is not restricted to the technical definition of a tort, but includes any act committed in this
state which involves breach of duty to another and makes the one committing the act liable to
respondent in damages." Id. 217-18, 231 N.E.2d at 3. This would appear to support the
"economic effects as tort" argument. Poindexter, however, involved a cause of action brought
under the Illinois Paternity Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 106-3/4, §§ 51-66 (1967), whereby plaintiff
sought support and maintenance for her illegitimate child. Id. at 214, 231 N.E.2d at 2. The
defendant objected to service outside the state under § 17(1)(b), arguing that he did not commit
a tortious act in Illinois. Id. at 216, 231 N.E.2d at 2-3. The court concluded that the failure of a
father to support an illegitimate child did constitute a tort because it involved a breach of his
duty to support the child. id. at 218, 231 N.E.2d at 3. The breach of duty in Braband, if in fact
there was one, was to the users of the defectively manufactured aircraft and not to the plaintiff
survivors.
43. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961).
44. Certainly the survivors of a person killed in an accident suffer great personal loss. It is
conceptually difficult, however, to say death in State X by virtue of a tortious act committed
there gives rise to jurisdiction in State Y based on that death simply because the plaintiff sur-
vivors are domiciled in State Y. See American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron
Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1971). The forum of the cause of action depends on the acts
of the defendant, not on the domicile of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235 (1958). As stated by the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray, a jurisdictional question under
§ 17(1)(b) depends on whether the tortious act was committed in Illinois. Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762 (1961). In
Braband, neither the alleged misconduct of the defendant nor the injury occurred in Illinois.
The defendant manufactured the airplane five years earlier in Kansas. The consequences of
defendant's misconduct and the last event which took place to render the defendant liable
occurred in Canada.
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Illinois ... is too weak a connection to lift these facts outside the reach of
the due process clause." 45
Being unable to expand the definition of a section 17 "tortious act" to
include the economic effects from a tort, the Illinois Supreme Court was left
with two choices: either dismiss the case 46 or find another means of impos-
ing jurisdictional authority over Beech. The court chose the latter option,
relying on sections 13.3 and 16 of the Civil Practice Act 4 7 to justify its ac-
tions. By utilizing these two sections, the court determined that although
Beech was incorporated in Delaware and had its principal place of business
in Kansas; it was transformed into a de facto resident of the state for jurisdic-
tional purposes.
Section 16 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act provides for out-of-state service
of summons either on residents or non-residents who have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Illinois courts. 48 The relationship between section 16 and
section 17, the long-arm statute, is unclear in that it can be analyzed in
either of two ways. One approach is to look to section 16 for the require-
ments of out-of-state service. Under this analysis, the defendant who is not a
citizen or resident of the state must have submitted to jurisdiction by doing
one of the acts enumerated in section 17. In such a case, the cause of action
must arise from that act. 49 This reasonable, although somewhat restrictive,
interpretation of the two sections is incorporated in the Joint Committee
Comments accompanying sections 16 and 17. 50 The Braband court, how-
ever, could not adopt such an analysis because the instant cause of action did
45. 51 111. App. 3d at 310, 367 N.E.2d at 129 (Downing, J., dissenting).
46. Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and improper service of process would be appropriate
since plaintiffs sought to acquire jurisdiction pursuant to § 17 and served the defendant at its
principal place of business in Kansas. Appellee's Supreme Court Brief, supra note 33, at 14-27;
Record, supra note 13, at 37. No attempt was made to serve any agent of the defendant in
Illinois. Record, supra note 13, at 37. Dismissal, of course, would force the plaintiffs to undergo
the time and expense of filing suit in another and possibly less-favorable jurisdiction. See
Zammit, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 931 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as Zammit], for a discussion of the effects of plaintiff's choice of forum on the
outcome of litigation.
47. See note 23 supra.
48. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 16; note 23 supra.
49. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(3); note 30 supra.
50. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 16 (Smith-Hurd), which states:
[P]ersonal jurisdiction is obtained over a citizen or resident of this state or over a
person who has submitted to jurisdiction under section 17, by serving him as pro-
vided in this section.
Jurisdiction based upon acts constituting a submission to jurisdiction of the courts of
this state is discussed in the comment to § 17. (Emphasis added).
But see Gordon v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 273 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. I11. 1967), where the
court found the advisory notes not binding and upheld jurisdiction over a non-resident on the
basis of § 16 because the "act submitting to jurisdiction" was the defendant's continuous and
substantial business contacts in Illinois.
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not arise from any section 17 act. 51 Therefore, the court had to search for
another approach to the two sections.
The second and broader interpretation of section 16, although not dis-
cussed in the Joint Committee Comments, sanctions various ways, other than
through section 17 acts, that a non-resident can "submit to the jurisdic-
tion" of Illinois courts and thereby be served "as if a resident of the
state." 52  This was the approach used in Braband.
The court found Beech to be "present and doing business" in Illinois
based on four types of alleged activity. Heavy emphasis was placed on a
written agreement between the defendant and Hartzog Aviation, an
independently-owned Illinois company, 5 3  permitting Hartzog to
purchase aircraft in Kansas for resale to the public. Secondly, the defend-
ant's marketing manager, the court noted, "frequently visited Hartzog with
the express purpose of promoting the sales of defendant's aircraft." 54  Also,
on one occasion Hartzog and the defendant sponsored a sales program in
Illinois for prospective buyers of Beech aircraft. 55 Finally, reliance was
placed on the fact that advertisements had appeared in Chicago area tele-
phone books exhibiting the defendant's logo and indicating where Beech
products and parts could be purchased. 56 Basing its decision on a superfi-
cial analysis of such activities, the court concluded that Beech had engaged
in activities rendering it a resident of the state. Despite the fact that
the comments accompanying sections 16 and 17 take a more restrictive
view, 57 the court chose to expand the means by which Illinois could assert
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The court's conclusion that the non-resident Beech Aircraft Corporation
had engaged in activities sufficient to render it amenable to service as a de
facto Illinois resident seems unwarranted in light of prior Illinois and United
States Supreme Court decisions. The circumstances under which such a
51. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17; notes 28-45 and accompanying text supra.
52. See St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff, 68 Ill. 2d 38, 369 N.E.2d 52 (1977).
53. 72 Ill. 2d at 559, 382 N.E.2d at 257; see note 21 supra.
54. Id. Actually the deposition of defendant's marketing manager showed only that he had
visited Hartzog Aviation approximately a dozen times in nine years. In addition, other alleged
contacts of the defendant in Illinois had not resulted in the sale of any aircraft to Hartzog
customers. Record, supra note 13, at 129-31.
55. 72 Ill. 2d at 559, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
56. Id. Koplin v. Thomas, Haab & Botts, 73 I11. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646 (1st Dist.
1966), discussed the question of whether advertising put and call options in Chicago newspapers
constituted the transaction of business within the State of Illinois. Quoting Koplin v. Saul
Lerner Co., Inc., 52 Ill. App. 2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (1st Dist. 1964), the court said "the
advertisements indicate the desire and hope for doing business, but none of these denote that
business was done. A willingness to do business and solicitation of business do not constitute the
doing of business." 73 I11. App. 2d at 250, 219 N.E.2d at 650 (emphasis added).
57. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
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transformation may or may not occur have been set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington58 and its
progeny, culminating with Shaffer v. Heitner. 59
Failure to Properly Apply United States Supreme Court Standards
For purposes of this discussion, the jurisdictional standards enun-
ciated by the United States Supreme Court can be labeled the
"substantial and continuous activities" standard, and the "defendant-forum-
litigation relationship" standard. Both standards were either ignored or mis-
applied by the Illinois Supreme Court in the Braband opinion.
In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court noted that juris-
diction over foreign corporations is proper where the defendant's contacts
with the forum are of such a substantial nature and so overwhelming that
the assertion of jurisdiction will come as no surprise.60 Isolated or casual
contacts are insufficient; the defendant's activities must be "continuous and
systematic." 6 1  In other words, jurisdiction can be properly asserted when
the defendant is put on notice 6 2 that the activities in the forum state are so
substantial that in essence he or she is considered a "resident"-that is,
physically present. Although technically a nonresident, 63 the defendant
could be considered a "resident" for jurisdictional purposes and called upon
to defend in the forum even for a cause of action unrelated to its forum
activities. This is the relevant standard that should have been applied
to support the assertion of jurisdiction in Braband.
Two Supreme Court cases decided after International Shoe illustrate the
"substantial and continuous" activities approach to state court jurisdiction. In
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia ex rel State Corporation Commis-
sion, 65 the Court upheld jurisdiction in Virginia over a Nebraska-based as-
58. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
59. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
60. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1945). See, e.g., Perkins v.
Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (defendant operated a substantial part of his
business from the forum state); Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia ex rel State Corp. Comm'n.,
339 U.S. 643 (1950) (defendant solicited business from forum residents for 40 years); Gordon v.
International Tel. & Tel. Co., 273 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (defendant continuously so-
licited business and secured business contracts in the forum state for 30 years); St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. Co. v. Citchoff, 68 I11. 2d 38, 369 N.E.2d 52 (1977) (defendant maintained office
and full-time employees in forum state).
61. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
62. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
63. In such a situation, the defendant is a non-resident because the corporation is legally a
resident of another state and has its principal place of business in another state.
64. An example of this is found in St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Gitchoff, 68 I11. 2d 38,
369 N.E.2d 52 (1977), where the Illinois Supreme Court explained that § 13.3 of the Civil
Practice Act "has been judicially construed to require that a corporation be 'doing business' in
the State to justify the conclusion that the corporation was sufficiently 'present' so that it could
be served in the same manner as other resident corporations." Id. at 43, 369 N.E.2d at 54
(emphasis added).
65. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
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sociation engaged in the mail-order insurance business. The Court em-
phasized the prolonged period over which the appellant solicited business
from Virginia residents and stressed the fact that the appellant caused
numerous insurance claims to be investigated there. 66 Such contacts, the
Court said, were not "mere isolated or short-lived transactions." 67 Meas-
ured by the standards of International Shoe, "the contacts and ties of appel-
lants with Virginia ... justihied] subjecting appellants to . . .proceedings
[in Virginia]." 68
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 69 the Court also upheld
the state's right to assert jurisdiction 70 due to the defendant's extensive ac-
tivities in the forum. 71 In essence, the defendant's total business operation
was run from the forum during part of World War II. Based on the facts and
circumstances in Perkins, the defendant's contacts were found to be perva-
sive, substantial and continuous, and supported a cause of action based on
activities entirely distinct from the company's activities in the forum. 72
66. The appellant over a 40 year period had issued insurance certificates to Virginia resi-
dents and had solicited new business by requesting names of prospective Virginia customers
from the ranks of its current Virginia insureds. Evidence showed that the appellant had over
800 insureds in the state at the time suit was instituted. In addition, the appellant had caused
claims for losses to be investigated in Virginia and could sue there for the enforcement of the
obligations of certificate holders. Finally, the Court acknowledged Virginia's strong regulatory
interest in overseeing insurance obligations in the State. Id. at 646-48.
67. Id. at 648.
68. Id.
69. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
70. Id. at 448. The issue in Perkins was whether the due process clause prevented or com-
pelled Ohio from asserting jurisdiction under the facts and circumstances of the case. id. at 439,
447.
71. Id. at 447-48. The defendant's company was located in the Philippines. During World
War II its operations were completely halted due to the Japanese occupation of the islands. The
company president returned to his home in Ohio and conducted the business affairs of the
company from that state. This included keeping office files, conducting directors' meetings, and
maintaining and using local bank accounts in Ohio. In essence, the company's total business
operation was run from Ohio during his stay there.
72. Id. at 446-49. The lawsuit in Perkins was brought in Ohio by a non-resident stockholder
of the defendant. The cause of action did not arise in Ohio nor did it relate to the foreign
corporation's activities there. Id. at 438. Professor Zammit has suggested that Perkins is unique
in that, due to the war, Ohio was the only forum reasonably available to the plaintiff with which
the defendant had any connections. He goes on to note, however, that the Supreme Court did
not use this rationale. Rather, the Court concluded that on the basis of the defendant's activities
in Ohio, it was just and reasonable to require the corporation to defend there. Zammit, supra
note 46, at 932.
It is interesting to note that in Travelers the lawsuit was instituted to secure a cease and
desist order regarding further sales or offers of insurance until defendant complied with the
Virginia "Blue Sky Law." Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia ex rel State Corp. Comm'n., 339
U.S. 643, 645 (1950). See also notes 65-68 and accompanying text supra. Thus, the cause of
action was related to the defendant's forum activities. The Court, however, did not comment on
this fact, choosing instead to rely on the "continuous and substantial" nature of the defendant's
activities. The defendant in Travelers actually satisfied both jurisdictional standards. See notes
60-64, 101-11, and accompanying text supra.
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Clearly, the activities of the defendant in Braband were not of such large
proportions. Beech Aircraft Corporation did not at any time conduct its busi-
ness operations in Illinois. 73  The mere existence of a non-exclusive, mutu-
ally cancellable agreement 74 with an independently-owned Illinois company
did not place the defendant's total business operation in Illinois. In addition,
Beech did not directly solicit customers in the forum for an extended period
of time, as occurred in Travelers. 75 Thus, the court's conclusion that Beech
was a de facto resident for jurisdictional purposes seems unjustified.
The Illinois court, moreover, declined to comment on the existence of
principal-agent relationship based on the agreement. 76 Such a discussion
would have given greater credibility to the court's finding that the defendant
was present in Illinois, since the agent's activities in the forum could be
imputed to the principal, thereby enhancing the quality and nature of the
foreign corporation's contacts.77 In the absence of such a discussion, the
court's conclusion is, in light of Perkins and Travelers, very weak. The
Braband facts show that the foreign corporation merely engaged in isolated
and erratic visits to the state that could not be considered conducting a
substantial and continuous part of its business in Illinois. 78 In light of such
facts, it is obvious that Beech did not have sufficient contacts for a "resident"
status.
Since Beech's activities in Illinois did not warrant the conclusion that it
was a resident for jurisdictional purposes, could Illinois have sustained juris-
diction over the defendant as a non-resident? It is doubtful in light of prior
case precedent. International Shoe held that in personam jurisdiction was
not predicated solely on physical "presence." 79  Where a non-resident de-
fendant is involved, jurisdiction depends on whether there is sufficient
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the
73. See notes 13, 21, 25, 31 supra.
74. Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 111. App. 3d 296, 311-12, 367 N.E.2d 118, 130 (1st
Dist. 1977).
75. It should be noted that mere solicitation of business, without more, has never been the
standard for jurisdiction over foreign corporations in Illinois. See, e.g., Lindley v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 276 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. I11. 1967), rev'd, 407 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1968); Koplin v.
Saul Lerner Co., Inc., 52 I11. App. 2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (1st Dist. 1964). The lower court in
Lindley originally upheld jurisdiction because the defendant allegedly engaged in a continuous
course of business in Illinois by maintaining a solicitation office in the state for 30 years. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit, applying Illinois law, specifically limited the interpretation and
application of § 13.3 and found the defendant's activities insufficient to justify in personam
service of process. 407 F.2d at 643.
76. It is interesting to note that Justice Stamos' opinion at the appellate level was based
entirely on this point, yet the Illinois Supreme Court did not mention the subject. See Braband
v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 I11. App. 3d 296, 303-07, 367 N.E.2d 118, 124-27 (1st Dist. 1977)
(Stamos, J., concurring).
77. See, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
78. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text infra.
79. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945).
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suit [does] not offend traditional notions" of due process.80 The terms "pres-
ence" and "present" are merely symbols used to describe the conclusion
that the non-resident's forum activities satisfy due process. 81 The problem
with the International Shoe standard is that the language used is inherently
uncertain. 82 The Court did not expressly state that to satisfy due process
there must be a relationship between the cause of action sued upon and the
non-resident defendant's activities in the forum. Rather, it took a "back
door" approach stating that where the cause of action arises from or relates
to forum activities, due process is not denied by requiring the non-resident
defendant to conduct its defense there. 83
Cases decided immediately after International Shoe emphasized the im-
portance of something more than fictional "presence" as a basis for state
court jurisdiction over non-residents. In McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance Co., 84 the cause of action was based on an insurance contract between
the plaintiff's decedent, a resident of the forum, and the defendant foreign
corporation. 85 After commenting on the evolving nature of commercial
transactions in today's modern business world, 86 the Court said it was "suffi-
80. Id. at 316.
81. Id. at 316-17. See also Zammit, supra note 46, at 923-25.
82. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 323 (1945) (Black, J.); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Mosell, 67 I11. 2d 321, 368
N.E.2d 85 (1977) (Dooley, J., dissenting). See also F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 640 (1965);
Royce & Mason, Non-resident Jurisdiction in Business Litigation PART 1, 53 CHI. B. REC. 100,
101 (1971); Comment, Civil Procedure-Jurisdiction-Shaffer v. Heitner-If Int'l Shoe Fits,
Attach It, 31 RUTO. L. REV. 308, 315 (1978). The Court's opinion failed to articulate why the
facts and circumstances of International Shoe made the assumption of jurisdiction reasonable or
just. Mr. Chief Justice Stone looked behind the "presence" theory to decide that a determina-
tion of reasonableness was being made, but failed to look behind that reasonableness to analyze
how it was being determined. Zammit, supra note 46, at 924, 934. See also Carrington &
Martin, supra note 9, at 231-33.
83. The Court phrased its conclusion as follows:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and so far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the State, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added).
84. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). McGee is generally considered the "culmination of the trend [be-
gun by International Shoe] toward expanding state court jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and other non-residents." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
85. In McGee, plaintiff's decedent, a California resident, purchased a life insurance contract
from an Arizona corporation. Later, defendant, a Texas corporation, assumed the insurance
obligations of the Arizona company and mailed a reinsurance certificate to the California resi-
dent who accepted the offer and paid his premiums by mail from California every year for eight
years until his death. Plaintiff, also a California resident and beneficiary of the policy, sued
when the defendant refused to pay the claim. 355 U.S. 220, 221-22 (1957).
86. The McGee Court noted that the trend toward expanding state court jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and other non-residents
is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the
years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more states and may in-
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cient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a contract which
had substantial connection with [the forum]," 8 7 emphasizing that the cause of
action arose from the defendant's business contacts with the state. 88
In Hanson v. Denckla, 89 however, the Supreme Court denied jurisdiction
because the cause of action did not arise "out of an act done or transaction
consummated in the forum state." 90 In this sense, Hanson differed from
McGee. 91 The Hanson Court made it clear that the liberal standards enun-
ciated in International Shoe did not "[herald] the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts." 9 2  However mini-
mal the burden on defendant of defending in the forum state, he or she
cannot be called upon to do so without sufficient minimum contacts. 93
Jurisdiction, the Hanson Court held, does not arise because the forum is the
"center of gravity ... or the most convenient location for litigation." 9"
Rather, jurisdiction accrues because of the acts of the defendant. 95
Hanson and McGee confirmed the indication in International Shoe that a
relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation was re-
quired before jurisdiction could properly be asserted over a non-resident. 96
No such relationship existed in Braband. The only connection with Illinois
in -the Braband suit was the fact that plaintiffs were Illinois residents. The
volve parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of
commerce has come a great increase in the amount of business conducted by mail
across state lines. At the same time modern transportation and communication have
made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where
he engages in economic activity.
355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957).
87. The decedent was directly solicited by the defendant insurance company and the con-
tract in question was delivered in California. Premiums were mailed by the decedent from the
forum every year for eight years and the insured was a resident of that State when he died. Id.
at 223.
88. Like Travelers, the McGee Court also pointed to the state's strong interest in regulating
and overseeing insurance obligations. Id. at 223. This factor, a state's interest in regulatory
areas, is often used to bolster the Court's decision to assert jurisdiction, but in and of itself is
insufficient to satisfy due process requirements. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 223
(1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); note 98 and accompanying text
infra. See also Note: State Court Jurisdiction Founded on Territorial Power Denies Due Process
to Nonresident Defendants -Shaffer v. Heitner, 27 DEPAUL L. REv. 447, 457 (1978).
89. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
90. Id. at 251. The Hanson Court denied jurisdiction over a non-resident trustee whose
contacts with the state were by correspondence with the settlor of a trust established in Dela-
ware. The settlor moved to Florida from Pennsylvania after the trust was created.
91. The Hanson Court said, "IT]he record discloses no instance in which the [defendant]
performed any acts in Florida that bear the same relationship to the agreement as the solicita-
tion in McGee." Id. at 252. See also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 n.19 (1977).
92. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 254.
95. Id.
96. See notes 79-83 and accompanying text supra.
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cause of action arose not from defendant's contacts with Illinois, but from an
accident in Canada. V The only contact the aircraft had in the forum was
that it took off from Illinois on its last journey. 98 Neither Beech nor its
distributor had any contact with the plane prior to that flight. 9 In fact,
Beech did not have any contact with the aircraft for five years preceding the
crash.'00
The exact meaning of the "defendant-forum-litigation relationship" re-
quirement was clarified in Shaffer v. Heitner,'0 ' where it was held that the
due process requirements of International Shoe must be satisfied to justify
any and all assertions of state court jurisdiction over non-resident defendants
who were physically present in the forum.1 0 2 Shaffer concerned an attemp-
ted assertion of jurisdiction over non-residents based on the mere presence
of their property in the forum.10 3 The property serving as a basis for state
court jurisdiction, however, was totally unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of
action. 10 4  The Court held that personal jurisdiction could not be upheld
where the property upon which jurisdiction was based was neither the sub-
ject matter of the litigation nor related to the underlying cause of action. 10 5
The Shaffer Court noted that although the presence of property might
suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation, it alone could not support jurisdiction. 10 6  There must be some
act, such as conducting substantial and continuous business activities in the
forum, 10 7 by which the defendant purposely avails himself of the benefits
and protections of the forum's laws.10 8  Even a state's "strong interest" in
97. 72 Ill. 2d at 550, 557, 382 N.E.2d at 253, 256; Record, supra note 13, at 63, 66. See
note 22 and accompanying text supra.
98. Record, supra note 13, at 64.
99. 51 I11. App. 3d at 307, 367 N.E.2d at 127.
100. The aircraft in question was manufactured by the defendant in Wichita, Kansas. In 1966
it was sold to an aircraft distributor in Texas. In 1968, the aircraft was sold by the Texas corpo-
ration to a Nevada company. In 1971 the Nevada company sold the plane to Coleman Aircraft
Corp. of Morton Grove, Illinois, who, in turn, sold it to Eagle Aircraft Services, Ltd., a British
corporation with its principal place of business in London, England. The aircraft crashed in
Canada on December 10, 1971, while it was being ferried from Coleman's place of business to
Eagle's location in England. 72 Ill. 2d at 550-51, 382 N.E.2d at 253; 51 I11. App. 3d at 307, 367
N.E.2d at 127.
101. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
102. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208, 212 (1977).
103. Id. at 213. Although Shaffer dealt with the question of quasi in rem jurisdiction, con-
ceptually the Court went much further and discussed the whole principle of in personam juris-
diction.
104. Id. at 209. The cause of action in Shaffer was a shareholder's derivative suit against
corporate directors who did not reside in the forum. Id. at 189.
105. Id. at 209, 213, 216-17.
106. Id. at 209.
107. In such a case, jurisdiction would be appropriate under the "substantial contacts"
theory. See notes 60-78 and accompanying text supra.
108. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958). See also International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). In Interna-
tional Shoe, the Court specifically related the cause of action and the activities by which the
defendant avails himself of the benefits and protections of the forum. Id. at 319.
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the matter, without more, fails to demonstrate that it is a fair forum for the
litigation. 10 9 Shaffer made it clear that the "minimum contacts" that make
it reasonable to compel a true non-resident to defend a lawsuit in the forum
state require, at a minimum, a relationship between the defendant, the liti-
gation, and the forum."x 0 It is this relationship which was ignored in
Braband, since the Illinois court found Beech to be a de facto resident of
the state by virtue of alleged activities conducted there."'
Beech's isolated and casual activities in Illinois were neither the subject
matter of the litigation nor related to the underlying cause of action. The
subject matter of the litigation was the alleged defective manufacture of an
aircraft in Wichita, Kansas, and the cause of action was a wrongful death suit
based on the crash of that aircraft in Canada.
Failure to Properly Apply Prior Illinois Case Law
The Illinois court found that the "quality and nature" of the defendant's
activities showed sufficient contacts with Illinois so as not to offend "tradi-
tional notions of fair play and effective justice." 112 This finding, however,
was unwarranted not only in light of prior United States Supreme Court
decisions but also prior Illinois case law. In Nelson v. Miller, u1 sections 16
and 17 of the Civil Practice Act were first challenged on due process
grounds. The Illinois Supreme Court said there was "no injustice to the
nonresident in a requirement that he return . . .to the place to which the
injury was inflicted."" 4  In Nelson, the defendant was a Wisconsin com-
pany whose employee performed acts in the forum within the
scope of his employment and that gave rise to injury in Illinois. 115 This fact
provided the "minimum contact" necessary to satisfy due process and
created the link between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum. 116
109. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215 (1977). The Braband court tried to justify its
assertion of jurisdiction over Beech by noting the state's interest "in providing redress in its
own courts against persons who inflict injuries upon, or otherwise incur obligations to, those
within the ambit of the state's legitimate_ protective policy." 72 I11. 2d at 556-57, 382 N.E.2d at
256, citing Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 384, 143 N.E.2d 673, 676 (1957). The state's
interest in protecting its residents, however, does not suffice to meet due process requirements.
The due process clause requires that non-resident defendants have adequate notice of the claim
against them and notice that their activities may subject them to jurisdiction. Accord, Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Beech's
activities did not provide such notice. See notes 53-57, 125-29, and accompanying text infra.
110. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 207, 209 (1977). See also note 10 supra.
111. 72 III. 2d at 558-60, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
112. 72 Ill. 2d at 558, 559, 382 N.E.2d at 257.
113. 11 I11. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
114. id. at 385, 143 N.E.2d at 677 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 391, 143 N.E.2d at 680.
116. The Nelson court noted that §§ 16 and 17 "reflect a conscious purpose to assert jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause." Id. at 389,
143 N.E.2d at 679. The court, however, noted that such authority may be asserted only over
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Similarly, the court in Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp. 117 held that the particular act or transaction in question must have a
connection with the forum if the "minimum contacts" standard of Interna-
tional Shoe was to be satisfied. 118 Otherwise, the Gray court noted, the
non-resident defendant must have forum activities "of a sufficiently substan-
tial nature" 119 to be required to defend a suit in the state on a cause of
action unrelated to those activities. In Gray, the cause of action was also
prompted by an injury that occurred in Illinois, although the defendant's
alleged misconduct took place elsewhere.12 0
Since neither the injury nor the defendant's alleged misconduct in
Braband occurred in Illinois, the crucial question becomes whether prior
Illinois decisions support jurisdiction because Beech had such substantial
contacts with the state that "it could be served in the same manner as other
resident corporations." 121 In St. Louis-San Francisco Railway v. Gitch-
off, 122 the appellant's forum activities went beyond mere solicitation and
were sufficiently substantial to support jurisdiction. 123 The appellant, al-
though not licensed to do business in Illinois, maintained a Chicago office
staffed with seven employees. In addition, over a ten year period the appel-
lant's assistant superintendent spent 60-80% of his working time in the
state. 124
Beech's activities in Illinois, however, were neither qualitatively nor quan-
titatively as substantial. The agreement between Beech and Hartzog was
nonexclusive, mutually cancellable, 125 and had nothing to do with the law-
suit in question. Beech's marketing manager, moreover, visited Hartzog
"approximately a dozen times in nine years." 126 Nothing in the record
states who initiated or paid for the sales program, 127 nor who placed or paid
defendants who have the requisite minimum contacts with the forum. Id. at 389, 143 N.E.2d at
679. In Nelson, the § 17 long-arm statute was used to gain jurisdiction over the Wisconsin
defendant. Since § 17 requires that the cause of action arise from a § 17 act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, § 17(3), a relationship between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum existed.
Therefore, the "minimum contacts" standard was met.
117. 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
118. Id. at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
119. Id.
120. See note 38 supra.
121. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff, 68 I11. 2d 38, 43, 369 N.E.2d 52, 54 (1977)
(emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. See also Gordon v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 273 F. Supp. 164 (N.D. Ill. 1967);
Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco By., 276 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. I11. 1967).
124. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Gitchoff, 68 Ill. 2d 38, 41; 369 N.E.2d 52, 53 (1977).
125. Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 111. App. 3d 296, 311-12, 367 N.E.2d 118, 129-30
(1st Dist. 1977); Record, supra note 13, at 78, 79, 87; see also note 21 supra.
126. Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 51 111. App. 3d 296, 305, 367 N.E.2d 118, 126 (1st
Dist. 1977).
127. It is one thing to say a corporation partakes of the benefits and protection of a state's
laws and therefore subjects itself to jurisdiction when it initiates such a sales program and
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for the advertisements. 128 It strains reason, therefore, to suggest that any
company who comes into the state to visit a customer or any company whose
customers advertise its products has consented to jurisdiction in Illinois with
respect to a cause of action totally unrelated to those activities. 129 As Mr.
Justice Stevens said in his concurring opinion in Shaffer, "the [due process]
requirement of fair notice also . . . includes fair warning that a particular
activity may subject a person to jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign." 130
If the defendant's alleged misconduct or the consequences of it had oc-
curred in Illinois, there would be no question that the Illinois court could prop-
erly have asserted jurisdiction. 131 If Beech had directly solicited the plain-
tiff's decedents1 32 or the cause of action had arisen from defendant's contacts
with Illinois, jurisdiction also would have been warranted. If Beech had con-
ducted a continuous and substantial part of its business in Illinois 133 or the
cause of action arose from some act done or transaction consummated by the
defendant in Illinois, 134 the court's decision would have been justified. But
where jurisdiction is asserted merely on the defendant's isolated or casual
activities in the forum and the cause of action does not arise from any of
these activities, due process is not satisfied.
To hold as the Illinois Supreme Court did in Braband is to open a "veri-
table Pandora's Box of litigation." 135 It is to suggest that alleged misconduct
in one state (Kansas) causing injury in a second state (Canada) allows suit in
a third state (Illinois), even though the defendant did not have contacts of a
sufficiently substantial nature to be considered a resident of the forum. 136
culminates sales transactions with citizens of the forum state. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235 (1958). It is quite another thing to draw the same conclusion when the foreign corpo-
ration has been invited to assist in a presentation planned and paid for by an independently-
owned company and which will benefit directly only that latter company.
128. Each advertisement shown in the record is listed under an independently-owned com-
pany's name. Since the court refused to comment on any principal-agent relationship between
Hartzog and Beech, the question of use of a corporate logo as a basis for jurisdiction was not
addressed. Additionally, to find the placement of advertisements by independent companies as a
means of jurisdiction over a second company would mean that anytime a local merchant adver-
tised products manufactured by others but sold in the merchant's store, the manufacturer would
be "present and doing business" in Illinois and therefore subject to jurisdiction. Surely, this was
not the intent of our legislature, nor the United States Supreme Court in International Shoe.
129. Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977) (discussion of purchasing securities in a
state as a basis for consenting to jurisdiction in that state).
130. Id. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
131. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 I11. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961); Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
132. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia
ex rel State Corp. Comm'n., 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
133. Perkins v. Benguet Consul. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Travelers Health Ass'n. v.
Virginia ex rel State Corp. Comm'n., 339 U.S. 643 (1950); St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v.
Gitchoff, 68 I11. 2d 38, 369 N.E.2d 52 (1977).
134. Hanson v. Denekla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
135. American Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co. v. Dytron Alloys Corp., 439 F.2d 428, 434
(2d Cir. 1971).
136. See notes 60-78 and accompanying text supra.
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Moreover, although the defendant is a non-resident, the decision suggests
that jurisdiction may be upheld absent a relationship between the defendant,
the litigation, and the forum. 137 As the decision now stands, there is
"hardly any limit but the sky" 138 to the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court overstepped the inherent limitations of the
due process clause when it found a foreign corporation to be a de facto
resident of the state for jurisdictional purposes. It cannot be said that the
Illinois activities of Beech constitute such a pattern of business activities as
to qualify under the "continuous and substantial" test. While the "minimum
contacts" standard is not to be mechanically or quantitatively applied,' 39 due
process surely requires more than the isolated, erratic events found suffi-
cient to impose jurisdiction in Braband. Absent the Shaffer requirement of a
relationship between the defendant, the litigation, and the forum, Illinois
should not have sustained jurisdiction under the facts and circumstances of
this case.
Because the Illinois Supreme Court did not enunciate any concrete stan-
dards for the transformation of a non-resident defendant into a resident, its
ruling in Braband v. Beech Aircraft Corp. opens the door to assertions of
jurisdiction not intended by the Supreme Court in International Shoe or its
progeny. If the Braband decision is not reconsidered, non-resident defend-
ants will become subject to Illinois jurisdiction solely because of their iso-
lated and casual visits to the state.
Kathleen A. Rittner
137. See notes 84-111 and accompanying text supra.
138. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 326 (1945) (Black, J.).
139. Id. at 319.
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